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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff has standing to bring this appeal. Plaintiff brought this action, served or 
failed to serve various parties and is in the best position to bring that matter to the 
attention of the Court. 
The attorney's fee affidavit is inadequate to support the award of fees made in this 
case. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Defects in Service of Process are in the Record of the Lower Court. 
The Plaintiff is the one that initiated this case and served such process as was 
served in the case. The Plaintiff is the one in the best position to know and question 
what was and was not done in serving process in this case. 
There is no bright line test for establishing standing. The cases cited by 
Defendant explain the policy and case by case analysis needed to determine if there is 
standing. As the Utah Supreme Court has said in Terracor v. Utah Bd. Of State Lands, 
716 P.2d 796, 798(1986): 
The doctrine of standing is intended to assure the procedural 
integrity of judicial adjudications by requiring taht the parties to a lawsuit 
have a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the dispute and sufficient 
adverseness that the legal and factual issues which must be resolved will be 
thoroughly explored. Unlike federal law where standing doctrine si related 
to the "case or controversy" language of Article III of the United States 
Constitution; our standing law arises from the general precepts of the 
doctrine of separation of powers found in Article V of the Utah 
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Constitution. Under Utah law, the doctrine of standing operates as a 
gatekeeper to the courthouse, allowing in only those cases that are fit for 
judicial resolution. Important jurisprudential considerations dictate that 
courts confine themselves to resolution of those disputes most effectively 
resoved through the judicial process, i.e., crystalized disputes concerning 
specific factual situations. ... Thus, the doctrine of standing limits judicial 
power so that there will not 'be a significant inroad on the representative 
form of government, cast[ing] the courts in the role of supervising the 
coordinate branches of government... [and converting] the judiciary into an 
open forum for the resolution of political and idelogical disputes about the 
performance of government.' ... For this reason, this Court will not lightly 
dispense with the requirement that a litigant have a personal stake in the 
outcome of a specific dispute. ... Nevertheless, it is difficult to make useful, 
all-inclusive generalizations that determine whether standing exists in any 
given case, since the issue often depends on the facts of each case." 
(Citations omitted.) 
Elsewhere the Utah Supreme Court observed that "At the outset, we note that 
standing issues often turn on the facts of a case and that '[generalizations about standing 
to sue are largely worthless as such.'" Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 
451, 453 (1985). The generalizations argued by Defendants in this case are 
unpersuasive. The facts of this case demonstrate that Plaintiff not only has standing to 
bring their appeal on the sufficiency of the lower Court's jurisdiction, the Plaintiff is 
ideally situated to bring this issue to this Court's attention. 
In this case, the facts which weigh against the Defendants' argument are as 
follows: Plaintiff initiated this case and therefore it was the Plaintiff who served or failed 
to serve process. Therefore, it is the Plaintiff who is in the best position to know what 
deficiencies exist with the process which Plaintiff employed. Plaintiff's interests are 
hostile to Defendants and Plaintiff is in an ideal position to advance that information 
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which is in Plaintiff's possession to prevent an error in this case. Plaintiff has been the 
victim, in this case, of an earlier overlybroad judgment entered on this same property. 
And earlier judgment which foreclosed all "Defendants" was determined to include 
Plaintiff's interest despite the fact that Plaintiff had not been served in that case. 
Therefore, Plaintiff has first hand experience in having rights with respect to this very 
property forfeited as a consequence of sloppily drafted orders. 
Beyond the named parties in this action, Plaintiff did not name all potential 
claimants who may have interests in the property. The list of Defendants in this case 
were taken from a title report used in drafting the initial complaint. After filing this case 
Plaintiff learned that there were other interests also claiming against this property. These 
other parties were never added to this litigation. One of those other interests arose out of 
a tax sale1. That interest was deeded to TWN, an entity which is both friendly to 
Plaintiff2 and currently litigating its claim in the Fourth District Court. An overly broad 
order in this case, despite the fact that the TWN interest was never included in this 
action, could potentially affect the outcome of the Fourth District Court. And, after the 
entry of the overly broad judgment here, the Defendants have in fact attempted to make 
such use of the judgment in that case. Since TWN was not named in this action, TWN 
cannot challenge the overly broad language used by Defendants in their draft of the 
lThis created a different root of title, and is an interest which was not named and 
therefore should not be affected by this action. 
2Plaintiff and TWN are in privity of contract. 
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lower Court's judgment. Accordingly, if Plaintiff cannot present this matter here, it will 
require further litigation in order to correct the problem in a cascading continuance of on-
going litigation. 
Plaintiff is in the best position to raise the question of the sufficiency of process 
since Plaintiff is in the unique position to inform the court as to what was done and not 
done. Plaintiff has an interest in seeing to it that a correct and proper judgment is entered 
in the case which Plaintiff initiated. Further, Plaintiff has an interest in the outcome of 
the TWN interest which was not named here. Plaintiff wants to protect that interest 
against any form of an overly broad judgment and misapplication of the proceeding 
below. The TWN interest is the subject of a currently pending Fourth District Court case 
in which the trial court there found that Defendants Michel have no interest. Nothing in 
the lower proceeding here should affect that, but an overly broad form of judgment may 
be used to attempt such an end. Plaintiff has that kind of interest to protect which will 
assure the Court that there is a "sufficient interest in the subject matter of the dispute and 
sufficient adverseness that the legal and factual issues which must be resolved will be 
thoroughly explored." Terracor, supra. Further, as an officer of the Court, Plaintiff's 
counsel is under an obligation to point out the defect to the Court so as to avoid plain 
error in the case. 
As to the argument that the Plaintiff bears the burden of challenging the propriety 
of the lower Court's jurisdiction, it is the state of the record in this case that the failure of 
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service of process was not challenged by Defendants below. The objection to the 
overly broad order pointed out that there was a failure to serve the named parties. The 
Defendant did not contest that. Rather, Defendants asked the Court to sign the order 
anyway. The lower Court also assumed there had been an insufficiency of service, but 
proceeded with the order anyway. Now, for the first time on appeal, the Defendants 
claim through innuendo only, that there was no basis for such a conclusion in the record. 
However, the affidavits of service in this case, when compared with the case caption, 
demonstrates that not all parties were served. 
2. Defects in Affidavit of Attorney Fees. 
The purpose of Rule 4-505, Code of Judicial Administration, is to allow an 
intelligent challenge to the award of fees. The affidavit does not allow such an 
intelligent examination or challenge for the claimed fees to be made. The affidavit is, 
however, facially subject to objection. 
The entry of 4-30-98 for "53.4" hours means nothing. Is this a claim for 53.4 
hours of work on that date? If so, there are not that many hours in the day and it is 
patently inappropriate. What was done for these 53.4 hours? Was it related to the work 
on this case? Was it a reasonable time to bill for the alleged work done? Does it include 
30 hours for writing a one-sentence letter? What was done, if anything at all? How can 
Plaintiff make a challenge to the reasonableness of the charge with such lack of 
information? More importantly, how can the lower Court conclude the charge is 
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reasonable with such lack of information? Yet that is all Plaintiffs were given and that is 
all the lower Court had. Under these circumstances, the lower Court erred and should 
have required a more sound basis to be established before making the award. 
Respondent's brief observes that there is a lack of information in the record to 
support the question of attorney's fees for this appeal. That is not because Appellant has 
failed to support this appeal. Appellant has provided everything there is to this Court. It 
is rather because after presenting all there is, there just is no support for any award of 
attorney's fees in this case. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Appellate Court should remand this case to the lower Court instructing it to 
modify and limit the judgment it enters to parties before it. It should further instruct the 
lower Court to require an adequate affidavit of attorney's fees to be submitted before 
entering an award of attorney's fees. 
DATED this 2-1 day of March, 2001. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
/ / 
, ' / . 
Denver (t. ^iwftrj Jr. 
Xfforney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, via first class mail, postage prepaid, on the following: 
Bruce J. Nelson 
NELSON, RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
576 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
/ 
, , / 
on this £*? day of March, 2001. • .. ] / * , « 
^ J i 
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